Although the new criminology held a mandate to advance novel critical genres, it developed a radical program at the expense of studying the bases of its critique. In this article, I argue that by overlooking the latter, influential strands of radical criminology (e.g. left realism) have inadvertently succumbed to the lure of an insubstantial critical pragmatism. Here, critique claims legitimacy either on the basis of an ability to secure universal emancipation, or increase managerial efficiency. Both claims are problematic since contemporary knowledge-producing arenas no longer embrace the certainties driving modernity's critical genres and technical efficiency disallows fundamental critique. As such, critique has been immoderately abridged. By not paying sufficient attention to such issues, many critical criminologists have not appreciated the extent to which their favored critical genres are ill-suited to an ethos wracked by uncertainty. In trying to recover legitimate genres of critique, I refer to recent developments within critical criminology and I explore how Lyotard's work can help us to reconceive critical practices in criminology. The discussion concludes with a prologue outlining an alternative critical genre that might claim legitimacy through 'paralogy.' 
The barren canvas of 1970's administrative criminology was brightened by the colors of a 'new criminology' that proposed a radical approach to crime and deviance. Through images of newness and difference, this discourse deployed a critical program, 'normatively committed to the abolition of inequalities of wealth and power' (Taylor et al., 1973: 281) . Its identification with 'those most immediately and directly affected by the inequalities' of capitalist society invited talk of revolutionary change (Taylor et al., 1974: 448) . The new criminology here claimed a mandate to draft alternative critical genres for approaching crime and/or deviance. In the event, however, this mandate was never developed beyond a totalizing 'utopiancritical point of view' (Taylor, 1995: 400-1) ; allusions to underlying critical genres were vastly overshadowed by attempts to define a distinctively radical (critical?) criminology (Taylor et al., 1975) . Consequently, the 'criminology' part of 'critical criminology' became focal as a blaring chorus of committed political engagement sounded; discussions about what criticism per se might mean were banished to the realms of esoteric irrelevance.
This was an unfortunate moment in the genealogy of critical criminology, for it has limited the discourse's ability both to apprehend, and respond to, fundamental challenges now facing modern critical genres (see Lyotard, 1984; Bauman, 1987 Bauman, , 1997 Pavlich, 1995; Osborne, 1996) . We shall return to these challenges later, but critical criminology's inability to resist a punitive neo-conservative 'crime solving' ethos, or to escape its technical lure, is a symptom of the condition (De Haan, 1987; Smart, 1992; van Swaaningen and Taylor, 1994) . Another symptom is the degree to which strands of critical criminology seek legitimacy under the rubric of dominant criminology forums; for instance, obtaining the standing of a 'Division' within the technically-orientated American Society of Criminology, or bidding for projects whose terms of reference reflect vested interests in preserving a given 'law and order'. Without clarity on the auspices of criticism in relation to current epistemological conditions, distinctions between varieties of critical and administrative criminology have blurred (Sumner, 1990; Rock, 1994) . Previously opposed currents of criminological thought now drift remarkably in sync with images of social stability, crimereduction, cost-effectiveness and administrative efficiency. Whatever the potential gains of these arrangements (Barak, 1994a) , questions remain about the abating place of critical inquiry. Bluntly stated, this ethos does not nurture spaces for critical programs to challenge, fundamentally, existing criminal justice system rationales.
Attempts to foster critique beyond existing arrangements require an analysis of criticism per se. However, there are few incentives, and often real disincentives, for critics to develop reflexive analyses directed at the auspices of criticism (see Ericson and Carriere, 1994; Nelken, 1994) . As such, critical criminology seldom reflects on its underlying bases, and so has not adequately grasped the ways in which spaces for fundamental critique (especially of the normative variety) are shrinking (Jameson, 1994) .
If the aim is to expand effective genres of critique in the context of criminology, it seems necessary to develop venues and roles for criticism appropriate to contemporary (postmodern? late modern?) epistemological conditions. 1 This article, therefore, focuses attention on the plight of criticism within critical criminological discourses and their relation to wider epistemological frameworks. In so doing, it disputes Thomas and O'Maolchatha's (1989) claim that criticism is simply a useful 'metaphor' for critical criminologists. To consider it so is to misinterpret how critical practice actually constitutes 'critical' criminology; criticism is the distinguishing feature of discourses that challenge (as opposed to champion) existing criminal justice precepts.
In broad outline, I argue that by not sufficiently exposing its foundations in criticism, the new criminology's attempt to develop a fundamental critique became susceptible to the diluting effects of 'left realist' pragmatism. Critical thinking has here been compromised by appealing either to anachronous or to managerial ways of legitimating its knowledge claims. Such appeals come at the cost of limiting the search for effective avenues of critique. Sensing such limitations, several recent developments in critical criminology have responded by acknowledging, and trying to adapt to, a knowledge-producing ethos moving away from realist epistemologies. Yet, echoing past omissions, few reflexively analyse the bases of their critiques. In an attempt at redress, I refer to Lyotard's (1984) work to understand how significant changes to knowledge-producing contexts have transformed the meaning horizons in which critical genres seek legitimacy. Without a clear analysis of these knowledge-producing contexts, or how to adapt to (or challenge) them, critique is in danger of becoming unsustainable. The discussion concludes by briefly alluding to a critical genre, legitimized through 'paralogy' to develop critiques that resonate with the uncertainties of contemporary epistemological conditions.
The legacy of the 'new criminology'
The exuberance surrounding the new criminology's quest to develop 'new' ideas on 'crime' produced a different discourse from then dominant 'correctionalist' approaches (Taylor et al., 1973; Quinney, 1974) . At the outset, despite diverse interpretations, many critics assumed the validity of Marxist-inspired critique for emancipating social relations in capitalist societies (Chambliss, 1975) . This assumption yielded a prominent debate among the new criminologists which revolved around whether criminology could accommodate, and satisfy the aspirations of, Marxist critique (Taylor et al., 1975; Sim et al., 1987) . Before rehearsing aspects of this important debate, however, one might note the conspicuous absence of discussions on the nature of critique.
The publication of Taylor, Walton and Young's The New Criminology in 1973 set a marker for linking Marxist thought to the study of crime/ deviance. Yet, early on there were different views on how this might occur (O'Malley, 1987) . For some, such as Hirst (1975: 203) , the emerging 'radical' deviancy theory and 'new criminology' was a well-intentioned but misguided program. It had mistakenly elevated 'a given actuality of crime and law' to an absolute status worthy of scientific consideration. Hirst contended that the new criminology failed to consider crime's proper place in capitalist society's development:
There is no 'Marxist theory of deviance', either in existence, or which can be developed within orthodox Marxism. Crime and deviance vanish into the general theoretical concerns and the specific scientific object of Marxism. Crime and deviance are no more a scientific field for Marxism than education, the family or sport. (p. 204) Furthermore, to insert Marx's ideas into a disciplinary field (criminology) created under capitalist conditions entails a 'revision' that de-emphasizes core Marxist precepts (mode of production, class struggle, etc.). That is, an orthodox Marxist analysis of crime must defer to established (Marxist) concepts. This is not to say that the state, law or crime are invalid objects of analysis; rather, they are historical products of primordial materialist practices. With such precautions in mind, and reflecting degrees of 'revisionism', different formulations of 'Marxist-inspired', 'working-class' or 'revolutionary' criminology appeared (e.g. Hall et al., 1978; Platt and Takagi, 1981; Hinch, 1983; Ratner, 1985) . Very few advocated what was later called a 'romanticized' view of 'criminal as revolutionary ' (e.g. Quinney, 1974) . Most accepted Marx's reluctance to rely upon a class which is not part of a disciplined workers' movement (Hirst, 1975: 216; Hinch, 1983) . Even so, this supposed 'romanticism' became the focus of an attack on Marxist criminologies, and on a so-called 'left idealism' that 'managed to construct a theory of crime without a criminology!' (Young, 1986: 19) .
One might well ponder the problem intimated by this statement, since it seems merely to restate Hirst's intent. As well, one could question whether the designation of complex discursive threads of 'Marxist' criminology are adequately embraced by the imprecise concept of 'left idealism'. Regardless, the charges of 'romanticism' and 'left idealism' helped to differentiate a version of socialist 'realism' that established itself around calls to confront crime sui generis as a problem worthy of serious consideration (e.g. Taylor et al., 1975; Young, 1986) . The most prominent strand of this approach was developed through a so-called 'left realist' research program. The latter attacked orthodox Marxist formulations for retreating into economic determinism, thereby encouraging political apathy amongst radicals (Lea and Young, 1984; Matthews and Young, 1986; Young 1986; Schwartz, 1990; Lowman and MacLean, 1992) . Left realists worried that the narrow focus on 'the relation of state reaction to the political and economic needs of capitalism' leads to economic reductionism, and does not acknowledge the devastating effects of intra-class crime (Young, 1986: 26) . They argued that 'crime', when viewed as an ontological category of 'social harm', negatively affects working class people's lives; identifying its etiology and logos is thus crucial for a radical criminology program (Lea and Young, 1984) . This critique found support from early feminist work on crime that denounced the complacency of many radicals in respect of crime's effects on women (e.g. Heindensohn, 1968) .
Left realists criticized 'left idealists' for not taking crime seriously and allowing correctional criminologists to launch their conservative programs unchallenged. This was described as a case of missed opportunity: 'the building blocks for a new criminology, although available, were discarded' (Matthews and Young, 1986: 13) . Left realism, in its various incarnations, sought redress through a discourse guided by socialist principles, but practically deployed in local contexts (Lea and Young, 1984; MacLean, 1991; Young, 1991) . Left realists vehemently opposed so-called 'right realist' or 'administrative' criminology (e.g. Wilson, 1975) , but nevertheless accepted 'a pressing social and political need to take the question of crime seriously ' (Matthews and Young, 1986: 1) . Consequently, they redefined the project of radical criminology and offered a positive enunciation of its central features. No longer was radical criminology's main aim to create, 'empirically-grounded analyses which point the way out of inequality into a genuinely just and human society' (Taylor et al., 1974: 461) . Now, under the rubric of left realism, 'the major task of radical criminology is to seek a solution to the problem of crime and that of a socialist policy is to substantially reduce the crime rate' (Young, 1986: 28) . Phrased thus, the purpose of a radical criminology came to look suspiciously like that of its administrative counterparts, albeit launched from a different (socialist) platform. As Ericson and Carriere usefully explain:
Led by criminologists who appeared more radical in the 1970s, Left Realists have adjusted to a 1980s and 1990s 'realism' that really entails joining the ranks of those who take a pragmatic, piecemeal, administrative approach to the field on behalf of particular interests. (1994: 92) Whether this apparent convergence has confirmed the cooptation fears of neo-Marxist critics is a matter for another article.
2 However, the founding promise of a new criminology-to articulate the bases of a critical discourse-was never developed beyond the limits of an emancipatory, utopian approach to critique. Left realism's eager pragmatism eclipsed a focus on critical bases in favor of simply assuming the validity of an undefined 'radical' or 'socialist' criticism (Howe, 1994) . In view of its international influence-even if different across continents (Schwartz, 1990; van Swaaningen, 1997 )-left realism inclined many critics away from their founding critical auspices and nudged them closer to the technical concerns of administrative criminologists. Not surprisingly, and especially in the absence of a reflexive focus on the underlying critical forms, this inclination has come at significant cost to critical practice.
Left realism's forfeits
One need not deny the value of contesting neo-conservative 'law and order' programs to see left realism's engagement with administrative criminology as variously compromising a commitment to critical practice. There are three main forfeits to critical thinking which I shall address here. First, left realism founded itself on a 'radical' program between the extremes of 'left idealism' and the new 'administrative criminology' (Young, 1986: 23) . However, it is not clear what sort of critique such radicalism could inspire beyond vague images of a criminology for 'the most vulnerable members of capitalist societies' (Young, 1986: 29) . Worse, Young's conception of criminological theory does not include a need to account for 'socialist ' or 'radical' critique (1986: 28, 1988: 160ff.) , even if it provides an Archimedean point for challenging both Marxist and neo-liberal criminal justice practices (Lea and Young, 1984) . By not exposing its underlying assumptions, left realism has become vulnerable to the twin dangers of cooptation and/or premising its narratives on unspecified articles of faith. Yet, the trust it placed in a working class criminology was challenged by feminist scholars who questioned whether realism inspired by working class interests could adequately address the plight of women in criminal justice arenas (Cain, 1986; Gregory, 1986; Carlen, 1990; Hudson, 1993; Young and Rush, 1994) . Less sympathetic feminist critics charged left realism with a dogged attachment to concerns that disallow suitable avenues to address intricate gender inequities (Howe, 1994; Naffine 1995) . Smart (1992) too contends that realism has inhibited serious consideration of the diffuse power-knowledge complexes that subjugate diverse groups of women. Consequently, she predicts that the 'unholy alliance' between some feminists and left realists will likely lead to 'annulment' (1992: 81) . Whether one agrees with this or not, the point is that in its eagerness to proscribe on the basis of an assumed radicalism, left realism has failed to subject the very auspices of its critical framework to scrutiny. And this has rendered protagonists vulnerable to the charge of not dealing with the assumptions, limitations and effects of their underlying critical model.
Second, reformist engagement with existing criminal justice agencies has rendered left realism's precepts commensurate with those of administrative criminology, thereby diluting the new criminology's quest for radical criticism beyond correctional meaning horizons (Young and Rush, 1994) . Neo-conservative definitions of problems are all too often placed on left realists' agendas, with the latter frequently offering competing solutions to so-defined topics (e.g. McQueen, 1992) . In the process, and exacerbated by funding arrangements that nurture a competitive quest for research money, critical criminology has affirmed its attachment to criminology but strayed from its critical roots (Young, 1986: 27) . By seeking to define (through surveys), specify the causes of, and offer technical solutions to crime (e.g. multi-agency responses, 'the square of crime' models), left realism has positioned itself as a direct counterpart to correctional discourses (Young, 1992: 51) . In the process, its critical aspirations have been abridged, making it part of a ' "normal science" in an institutional laager' (Rock, 1994: xxii) .
Such developments have helped to regenerate crime as an absolute ontological 'reality', with a discoverable etiology (Young, 1986; MacLean, 1991) . As well, left realism has tied its discursive fate to 'crime' and is committed to a research program that, if successful, would ultimately require its dissolution. Stated another way, subjecting the notion of crime to the fundamental ontological critiques presented by Sumner (1990 Sumner ( , 1994 and Christie (1993) would jeopardize the very criminology that left realists seek to preserve. As Smart puts it:
The thing that criminology cannot do is deconstruct crime. It cannot locate rape and child sexual abuse in the domain of sexuality or theft in the domain of economic activity or drug abuse in the domain of health. To do so would be to abandon criminology to sociology; but more importantly it would involve abandoning the idea of a unified problem which requires a unified response. (1992: 77) Perhaps a critical criminology driven by notions of criticism rather than by definitions (or causes) of 'crime' as a 'real' ontological category might be less susceptible to this charge (Hulsman, 1986) . It would at least find the quibble over disciplinary boundaries less than crucial, so long as critical discourse is not constitutively bound to absolute notions of 'crime' (A. Young, 1996) . With a focus on criticism rather than criminology, it may be possible to deconstruct 'crime'; it could even be that a regenerated critical criminology is the most appropriate arena for such deconstruction (see Derrida, 1995: 85, 217 for parallels with philosophy).
Third, as a program that takes crime seriously, and prescribes solutions to particular problems, left realism appeals to modern forms of legitimating criticism. It has opted for what Bauman describes as a fading 'legislative' intellectual pursuit, closely associated with modern disciplinary power arrangements (1987: 110-26; 1992: 5) . This alludes to a failure to grapple with the importance of 'interpretative' criticism in uncertain conditions, and where the critical intellectual's social position is in transition (1987: 1-26) . I shall return to this later, but utopian critical judgements that claim to secure universal 'progress' on the basis of one privileged reason are greeted with some skepticism in uncertain times (see Vattimo, 1988; Bauman, 1997) . Stated crudely for the moment, without its modern auspices, critical practice that legislates in the name of universal emancipation and progress does so on increasingly incredible grounds (see Lyotard, 1984; Morrison, 1995: 451-73 ).
The accumulation of such forfeits has nurtured an unenviable predicament for left realists and-given its influence-for critical criminology. Many critics have spurned examining critical foundations, been drawn into conservative agendas and rest content with increasingly dated critical frameworks. As van Swaaningen and Taylor put it: after having paved the way for an alternative agenda, critical criminology was quite generally described, by the end of the 1980s, as being in crisis. Whether one wanted to blame 'the end of history', the demise of the grand narratives of progress and emancipation, the bankruptcy of socialism or the victory of individualistic consumerism, the project of critical criminology does not really seem to fit any more in the post-1984 world. (1994: 183) One might question whether this predicament is best described as a crisis. Regardless, it does indicate serious problems facing a critical discourse that has not appreciated how changes to wider epistemological conditions have maligned its critical practices. At stake here is not merely the issue of reviving Marxist, radical or critical traditions (Lynch, 1997) ; it has to do with the increasingly problematic foundations of criticism. It is not that critical criminology, in its utopian or realist moments, has failed to deliver the goods; rather, the rug has been pulled from underneath the critical practices that once seemed so integral to critical criminology. The very idea of a critical project has been problematized to a point where some critics now even question whether the word 'critical' has a specific meaning:
While the term 'critical' is a useful label for describing the interests of those who work under this rubric, I don't believe that its current usage has any specific meaning beyond the generic convenience of providing organisation and social-identity for its adherents. (Barak, 1994 (Barak, /1995 Without a clear sense of its distinguishing feature (i.e. criticism), critical criminology's capacity to foster an alternative discourse to mainstream correctionalism has been severely limited. No mere attempts at broader public participation by critical criminologists are likely to alter this underlying problem (see Tunnell, 1995) . Glimpses of this problem have yielded several potentially pivotal, even if fragmented, critical responses (Ericson and Carriere, 1994) . The next section identifies and examines four such responses in an effort to show how selected critics have adapted to the altering epistemological conditions facing them. This discussion prefaces further reflections on the overall plight of criticism under such conditions.
Critical fragments and criminology
The first response expresses disaffection with the very possibility of criminology's survival under late-or post-modern conditions. In some ways this bears traces of Hirst's previously noted skepticism, but now calls to depose critical criminology surface in other guises. For instance, Sumner (1994) argues that the sociology of deviance is no longer a viable discursive project, and points instead to the formulation of critical analysis around notions of social censure. Similarly, Smart, in considering articulations between feminism and criminology indicates why 'the core enterprise of criminology is profoundly problematic ' (1992: 77) . Echoing the gist of this position, Pitch sees the need for an arena in which:
'criminology' as a recognizable body of knowledge and research instruments is displaced: the criminal question may be approached via different avenues; rather it must be deconstructed by posing questions and using knowledges and tools that arise from outside its boundaries. (1992: 360) Turning away from the discipline though, is necessary because critical criminology is deemed incapable of responding to the fundamental objections raised by postmodernist feminists. Smart insists that criminology is not alone in being vulnerable to having questions raised about its ability to deliver on a technocratic program. But, she argues, 'criminology does occupy a particularly significant position in this debate because both traditional and realist criminological thinking are especially wedded to the positivist paradigm of modernism ' (p. 77) . If this underscores the overlap between left realism and administrative criminology, it also raises a question about criminology's capacity to transgress modern epistemological frameworks. This is an important issue, but I shall want to develop it with a slightly different inflection in the next section.
Second, one finds various attempts to elaborate upon radical criminology (e.g. Lynch, 1997). Mostly, these formulations develop the idea that criminology pursues 'the disciplined study of crime and crime control' and define crime in terms of 'social harm' (Barak 1994a: 1; Nelken, 1994: 1; Tifft, 1994 Tifft, /1995 . The aim of such endeavors is to envisage approaches to 'crime' that underscore 'criminology's commitment to social change' (Nelken, 1994: 20) . Examples here would include: anarchism and peacemaking (e.g. Pepinsky and Quinney, 1991; Ferrell 1994); Milovanovic's (1994) semiotics; critical histories (Beirne, 1993) ; feminist attempts to revamp a male-dominated criminology (e.g. Daly and Chesney-Lind, 1988; Gelsthorpe and Morris, 1992; Naffine, 1995 Naffine, , 1997 Rafter and Heindensohn, 1995 ); Braithwaite's (1989) call for 'reintergrative shaming'; Barak's (1994a) focus on state criminality; and Nelken's (1994) attempt to formulate a 'reflexive criminology'. In their various ways, these perspectives try to reorient critical criminology within current epistemological conditions, recognizing that underlying discursive frameworks have changed.
Third, there is an expanding discourse which views 'crime' as an historically produced linguistic and/or cultural construct demanding analysis beyond conventional criminology (Ferrell, 1994; Ferrell and Sanders, 1996) . This response questions 'realist' claims to the ontological priority of crime, focusing instead on how 'crime' is enunciated by culture-producing agencies within and beyond criminal justice systems. The objects of analysis include an aesthetics of criminals and prisons and, indeed, an aesthetics of authority (Ferrell and Sanders, 1996: 320) . These perspectives tend to agree that if the 'reality' of crime is enunciated through the dubious 'aesthetics' of surveys or legality, a given context usually ends up with punitive social control responses. Cultural criminology experiments with alternate definitions, including those that emerge out of cultural negotiations in movies, official reports, television dramas, graffiti, crime stories, media reports, and so on (e.g. Barak, 1988 Barak, , 1994b A. Young, 1990 A. Young, , 1996 Sparks, 1992) . One effect of such analyses is to indicate other definitions of (and possibly responses to) 'crime'. As such, this approach broadens the scope of criminology and reconceptualizes crime as a contingent outcome of processes that negotiate the 'realities' of, and responses to, crime. There is a deeply deconstructive edge to such formulations and a fertile attempt to align its conceptions with the uncertainties of our times.
Finally, and allied to the previous response's deconstructive tendencies, is a series of texts that challenge the epistemological frameworks of modern critical criminology. For the most part, these texts do so by variously linking up with debates on the 'postmodern'. Some assess how transformations of the altering conditions are likely to affect the practice of critical criminology (Hunt, 1990; Henry 1991; Ratner and Pavlich, 1993; Pavlich and Ratner, 1996; Milovanovic, 1997) . Others explore the influences of postmodern discourses on penal structures (Howe, 1994; Garland, 1995) . A few are skeptical of the concept's value (e.g. Hunt, 1990; Garland, 1995) , while Reiner (1992) heralds the 'postmodern' as a potentially viable avenue for regenerating critical agendas. Overall, though, most theorists evoke images of the postmodern with some trepidation, recognizing its use as an abbreviation for complex changes within our 'times'.
Although these texts signal possible discursive openings, Henry and Milovanovic's (1994, 1996) 'constitutive criminology' seems the most developed theory around this response. One of its central tenets is that:
In the process of investing energy in their socially constructed, discursively organized categories of order and reality, human subjects not only shape the world but are themselves shaped by it . . . constitutive criminology takes a holistic conception of the relationship between the 'individual' and 'society' which prioritizes neither one nor the other, but examines their mutuality and interrelationship. (1996: ix-x) More specifically, it theorizes about 'how we make order and crime while in the process order and crime-making, make us' (Henry, 1991: 77) . Developing a constitutive criminology entails searching for a version of criminology that is not wedded to legal definitions of crime, and which does not seek linear causality. Both strategies are seen to limit critical thinking to a rigidly modern ethos, and to inhibit criminology from nurturing just social formations.
In concert, these fragments indicate how critical criminology is confronting the shifting epistemological conditions of our time. Most no longer accept the left realists' view of crime as an absolute, ontological reality. The discourse seems again to emphasize contingent expressions of harm and/or processes of crime production; including a focus on the images that propel people to commit particular acts, or that elicit particular kinds of sanction. In so challenging realist assumptions, these responses highlight the fortuity of dominant conceptions of crime, and license investigations not anchored in these. All this is to the good, but still conspicuously missing from most formulations is a clear focus on critical genres that might challenge dominant discursive apparatuses and practices.
Such an omission is especially problematic in knowledge-producing contexts undergoing fundamental revision. Critics who do not reflect on the shifting grounds of critical thought are unlikely to appreciate how erstwhile knowledge-producing practices radically constrain new possibilities (B. Smart, 1993) . If under postmodern conditions knowledge is legitimated differently from modern conditions, it is also the case that modern criticism is no longer legitimated as it once was (Lyotard, 1984; Bauman, 1992 Bauman, : xv, 1997 ). As such, it is important to understand critical practices against the transformations of wider knowledge-producing arenas. In particular, if we are to develop defensible critical postures within criminology, several important issues require analysis. For instance we need to understand how critics characteristically justify their claims to knowledge in modern knowledge-producing contexts, focusing especially on the strategies reflected by critical criminologists. What has changed in these contexts to render previously endorsed (modern) critical practices problematic? What legitimacy strategies prevail in postmodern knowledgeproducing arenas, and at what cost to criticism? Is it possible to recover different ways of legitimating critical knowledge under postmodern conditions? By addressing these issues and questions, one could develop critical thinking in criminology and explore different ways of legitimating its claims to knowledge. In his report to the Quebec Government's Conseil Des Universités on the changing condition of knowledge, Lyotard (1984) addresses these matters directly. This report provides a thoughtful critique of contemporary critical thinking by focusing on the question of how knowledge claims are legitimated differently across modern and postmodern conditions. It also explores the possibility of legitimating knowledge differently through paralogy. As such, it holds out several promises for the present article's concerns, and so let us draw on Lyotard's report to develop the above arguments further.
Modern criticism, criminology and 'postmodern' conditions
Lyotard notes that an important part of the changing tides of knowledge production concerns the ways in which knowledge is legitimated. That is, in modern contexts knowledge tends to be legitimated by appealing to metadiscourses (e.g. reflexive discourses on science and its relation to philosophy), or to universal metanarratives. For example, Taylor et al. (1973: 281) justify their search for a new approach to criminology by deferring to materialist precepts that are normatively committed to expunging economic and political inequities. Their goal is to narrate in such a way as to displace the social arrangements that obstruct our ability to achieve 'full sociality', defined as: 'a state of freedom from material necessity, and (therefore) of material incentive, a release from the constraints of forced production . . . [where] . . . there would be no politically, economically, and socially-induced need to criminalize deviance ' (1973: 270) . If this is meant to justify their 'fully social theory of deviance' it also highlights the strategy of appealing to wider, universal metanarratives to legitimate specific critical analyses. One could make the point another way: why should we accept Taylor et al.'s 'immanent critique' of correctionalist criminology as true? Because, as its adherents implicitly suggest, it plays itself out of a purpose embracing universally applicable, absolute founding precepts: the search for 'a society in which men [sic] are able to assert themselves in a fully social fashion ' (p. 270) . This normative metanarrative is thought to be universally valid and is thus used to legitimate specific forms of thinking, speaking, writing, acting, etc. (as noted by Lyotard, 1992: 61) .
Such legitimating strategies are replicated in many critical criminology contexts, though the precise formulation of metanarrative varies; for example notions of social(ist) justice (Lea and Young, 1984) , anarchy (Ferrell, 1994) , and freedom from general oppression. The diverse formulations, however, tend to coalesce around themes of 'emancipation', taking the form of what might be described as 'emancipatory metanarratives' (Lyotard, 1992: 32, 36 ). The point is illustrated in Thomas and O'Maolchatha's reflexive analysis which posits that: the 'truth' of critical criminology-of any critical knowledge, for that matter-lies neither in its virtue or in its affective power. Rather it lies in an ability to transcend, even if not quite to escape, dominant ideas and to reshape them in ways that suggest new theoretical insights and empirical directions. (1989: 144) This modern emancipatory thread is highlighted by the importance placed on a capacity to transcend 'symbols of oppression' within criminal justice contexts (p. 154). Indeed, some argue that the quest for a utopia of one or other sort is crucial to any critical project. Transcendence promises an escape (even if limited) to a brighter future, and faith in the certainty of the promise serves as an a priori ground-critical criminology's secular eschatology as it were.
If this legitimates particular narratives, it also licenses critical forms that are grounded upon 'normative' principles, offers critical judgements of specific contexts based on these, and legislates suitable alternatives ('how things ought to be'). So, Taylor et al.'s quest for 'full sociality' licenses the universal principle that under equal social conditions, deviance would not need to be criminalized. The principle is regarded as apodictic and univer-sal, thus serving as an Archimedean point of departure for criticism. So, capitalist societies are judged to be exploitative and to nurture particular patterns of-and responses to-criminality. Such judgements become a credo for legislating what ought to be done, for recommending how to achieve an ideal state. Thus, a 'fully social theory' of deviance canvasses revolutionary practices that promote the ideal of equal and nonexploitative social relations.
The blueprint for criticism is familiar enough within critical criminology, but it is precisely this version that postmodern conditions render problematic. As Lyotard (1984: 39) astutely observes, we have recently lived through an internal erosion of the ways in which knowledge is legitimated in modern societies. That is, 'in contemporary society and culturepostindustrial society, postmodern culture-the question of the legitimization of knowledge is formulated in different terms ' (p. 37) . In an ethos of uncertainty, with its fracturing social identities (race, class, gender, age, sexual orientation, etc.), the appeal to universal emancipation to justify critical narratives seems difficult to sustain, and may even be greeted with incredulity (Lyotard, 1984; Bauman, 1997; Vattimo, 1997) . Lyotard (1984: 37-53 ) sees this happening alongside complex sociopolitical, cultural and economic developments, three of which are emphasized. First, he argues that liberal capitalism has been revamped by rampant consumerism that attaches individual enjoyment to the consumption of goods and services. This has helped to regenerate liberal social structures and to eliminate the communist alternative; hence, under postmodern conditions, Marxist calls for universal emancipation become problematic (1984: 38) . It may be that communist utopias are disputed, but more importantly the very posture of appealing to universal emancipation is problematized in societies where political opposition is grouped around diverse identities differentiated by class, race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc. Moreover, although not intrinsic to all modern critique, the catastrophic effects of specific utopias-such as the holocaust, apartheid, the Gulags-have helped to discredit the posture of modern emancipatory strategies. Second, Lyotard detects a certain nihilism in 19th century thinking which challenges the orders of knowledge that sanction universal thinking: 'by loosening the weave of the encyclopedic net in which each science was to find its place, it eventually sets them free ' (1984: 39) .
The third issue is, however, particularly central to our concerns. He argues that the emergence of post-industrial technologies problematized quests for knowledge sui generis (legitimized through 'speculative metanarratives'), as well as knowledge justified by promises of emancipation ('emancipatory metanarratives'). These are replaced by the rather more ominous legitimization of knowledge purely on the basis of pragmatic 'performativity criteria' under postmodern conditions. Here, knowledge is justified techno-administratively by claims to solve problems within, or to maximize the performance of, given systems. Claims to knowledge are judged not via appeals to credible metanarratives, but by promises to enhance the efficiency of closed systems. Such managerial knowledge seeks to improve performance within a demarcated arena; unless performance is affected, this ethos eschews critical insight into the morality, the underlying rationales, or social consequences of given systems. Under postmodern conditions, then, Lyotard detects a dangerous situation where, without credible metanarratives, knowledge is increasingly legitimated through the cold criterion of its ability to improve the performance of a system.
Left realist pragmatism has proved itself as vulnerable to this performance logic as its neo-conservative opponents. For example, what is striking about realist debates around the expansion of private prisons is its engagement with cost-effectiveness discourses (Matthews, 1989) . Like neoconservative perspectives, some left realist approaches assess the value of knowledge claims through their ability to improve the efficiency and cost effectiveness of private prisons (Harding, 1997) . If neo-classical criminologists seldom appeal to the speculative metanarratives of their classical predecessors, left realists now only vaguely allude to metanarratives of emancipation. Instead, both now defer to the logic of technocratic performance indicators. In the process, critical thinking is subordinated to efficiency concerns; for instance, abolitionist analyses that challenge the very logic, or foundations, of incarceration systems are rendered marginal. Using Lyotard's formulation to direct our focus on the plight of criticism within criminology allows us to note that seeking to legitimate critical knowledge through earlier metanarratives of emancipation is no longer tenable. To seek refuge in strategies whose bases have been eroded by changing epistemological conditions is likely to reduce, rather than expand, spaces for critical inquiry. At the same time, postmodern performance criteria disallow fundamental criticism that problematizes the very tenets of criminal justice systems. Criticism is not sustainable when it defers to performativity criteria that do not permit challenges to a system's logic; needless to say, criticism cannot flourish by appealing to forms of legitimacy that entail its very demise. What does this mean for criticism in criminology nowadays? Clearly, critical criminology cannot go on with its modern business as usual, or hold the postmodern as a panacea for its revitalization. At stake here is the search for strategies to legitimate critical narratives on grounds other than those of performativity, but which do not rely on the fading certainties of old metanarratives. Lyotard proposes a possible strategy common in some versions of science: 'legitimation by paralogy ' (1984: 60) . To this I now turn.
Paralogy and criticism: a prologue
Paralogy, for Lyotard, is a means of legitimating narratives that does not rely on emancipatory metanarratives, or the performance logic of technoadministrative reasoning; it is, as its etymology suggests, contrary (para) to specific versions of reason (logos). Stated positively, paralogy always gestures towards the unknown; it licenses attempts to find new ideas, to formulate new links within language that yield novel enunciations. For Lyotard, the function of 'paralogical activity' in science is to point out 'presuppositions' and 'to petition players to accept different ones . . . [the] only legitimation that can make this kind of request admissible is that it will generate ideas, in other words, new statements' (p. 65). As such, paralogy legitimates knowledge claims on the grounds of a relentless iconoclasm through which new vistas of language and practices are sought.
Yet what critical genres might paralogy legitimate? No doubt this question would require more detailed elaboration in the context of 'crimerelated' discourses than is possible here. However, the concept implies multiple critical practices bound neither to emancipation metanarratives nor to technical formulations of crime. Furthermore, such criticism could not emerge from an assumed historical consensus, either within predefined boundaries of a given system or from a broader vision of human nature. Paralogy, by contrast, legitimates the search for 'an idea and practice of justice that is not linked to that of consensus ' (p. 66) . It starts from the viewpoint that language games are heteromorphous and that 'any consensus on the rules defining a game and the "moves" playable within it must be local, in other words, agreed on by its present players and subject to eventual cancellation' (p. 66). Thus, paralogy nurtures marginal narratives and calls for the establishment of new voices and ideas, new calculations of the just and new idioms by which to formulate justice (Pavlich, 1996) . The cost of critical strategies centered around principles of a unified consensus, their 'terror', is the elimination of precisely that which paralogy attempts to recover: the local dissensus of those who contest hegemonic knowledges.
By way of brief elaboration, paralogy might license an approach to criticism such as the one Foucault (1984) alludes to in his critique of Kant. Foucault's view of criticism differs from the normative approaches common in critical criminology in that his does not seek universal apodictic foundations (Bernstein, 1991; Pavlich, 1995) . For one thing, as he notes, 'criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits' (Foucault, 1984: 45) , but not to establish-as in Kant-universally necessary limits. For him, 'the point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of possible transgression ' (p. 45) . In other words, the point of critique is not to discover the essential or necessary unity of given historical limits; rather, its role is to focus on contingent political processes that render such limited 'realities' possible. Accordingly, criticism need not entail the practice of comparing, or judging, local 'realities' with 'universal' principles-rather it could aim to develop an ethos that continuously directs itself to absence, the otherness, which makes possible the so-called 'realities' contained by given historical limits. Continually pointing to the constitutive place of contingent deferrals to absence could expose the non-essential, nonnecessary, character of any limits that espouse an inevitability (Derrida, 1995) .
Although much more needs to be said, such paralogical critique might, first, draw on Henry and Milovanovic's (1996) constitutive criminology and its attempt to reach beyond the ambit of postmodern horizons. Their dynamic, contingent and process-oriented vision of crime complements the view that existing limits are historically created and amenable to revision. At this level, paralogical critique has much to gain by referring to cultural criminology (e.g. Barak, 1994a; A. Young, 1996) , Sumner's (1990) work on censure, abolitionism (Bianchi and van Swaaningen, 1986; Christie, 1993 ) and Smart's (1992) poignant analysis of 'realism' in criminology.
Second, paralogical criticism might practice its 'relentless iconoclasm' by seeking out the impossible, against which the limits of our historical being are silhouetted. This posture suggests forms of criticism directed in search of, and receptive to, notions of otherness excluded by the discursive practices of given limits. Ongoing glimpses of alterity indicate a critical genre that is always 'on the way'. There is no final resting point, no clear path of progress, and no universally certain chart to serve as an independent basis of censure. However, even as an uncertain gesture directed beyond momentary historical horizons, such critique is located within limits and responds to these specifically and locally. That is, as Foucault notes, it subjects itself to the tests of local contexts, 'both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take ' (1984: 46) . Practical critique of this kind would seem to rescind absolute universal knowledge in favor of regenerating nuances within specific historical ontologies.
3 It could be used to encourage local narratives to bring about an 'insurrection' of knowledge silenced by the 'universal realities' of given limits (Foucault, 1980) . No doubt, criticism as relentless iconoclasm might usefully articulate itself to strands of feminist, critical race, prisoner and like discourses which actively recover silenced narratives (A. Young, 1990; Howe, 1994; Naffine, 1997) .
Finally, paralogical criticism does not depend on the role of critic as moral legislator, or technocratic expert. As a relentless iconoclast, the paralogical critic is an interpreter, a mediating bridge between the limits of existing identities and the enunciation of statements beyond these. This critic approaches images of 'crime', 'the law', 'police', 'incarceration', 'censure', 'deviance', etc., as contingent identities fashioned from limited discursive processes of differentiation, and defined through particular discursive practices. Given the consequences of such identities on people's lives, the search for dangers within given identity formations could be tied to a search for alternate patterns of differentiation. In turn, this might entail retracing the alignment of a given discourse, seeking 'new moves' by which to alter the ways given identities are established. The critic's role cannot be defined in advance, for under postmodern conditions, 'interpretation must make the interpreted knowledge sensible to those who are not "inside"; but having no extraterritorial references to appeal to, it has to resort to the "inside" itself as its only resource' (Bauman, 1992: 22) .
In addition, critics' voices are likely to be multiple without any one having privileged access to a final 'truth'; interpreters are left to persuade in local contexts, knowing that paralogy licenses no certain directives and no absolute guarantees of 'progress'. The epistemological age of iron gives way to clay; critical interpretations, too, assume their place within given historical formations. As interpreter, the critic aims to diagnose and chart the possible dangers of given limits, alluding to possible reconfigurations thereof.
Each of these briefly indicated features of criticism legitimated by paralogy could be articulated to the fragmented discourses associated with 'crime', 'criminal justice', and 'criminology'. The possible formats of such articulations are infinite, and would no doubt involve a vast elaboration of the broad sketch above. However, there is little point in suggesting howuniversally-this ought to be done, for that would reverse the spirit of confronting local dissensus, recovering silenced voices and seeking new ideas/rules. It would also come to look suspiciously like an attempt to revert from interpreting critic to legislating expert. After all, a positive yield of expressly focusing on criticism under contemporary criticism is to distinguish critical thinking from the technocratic logic that has reached so close to the heart of critical criminology. 'Enough', we might say, 'of that extortion which demands prescriptive or realist criticism for one to hold the mantle of critical thinking in criminology!' It is time to release the discourse from such yokes, and to recover again and again exuberant traces of criticism that refuse the administrative priorities of dominant trends in criminology. If paralogical legitimation moves thought in that direction, it might yet evade the absolute decrees and 'realities' that self-appointed experts impose on criminology, even of the critical varieties.
Notes
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1. Given the hapless state of debates on the topic, one is almost obliged to clarify one's use of 'postmodern conditions'. The term 'conditions' is meant to avoid implying a stable or singular essence to notions of the postmodern. It highlights the uncertain narratives of an ethos no longer committed to universal knowledge charged with an ability to guide history progressively (see Jameson, 1994) . The modern and postmodern are inextricably related modes of being; the prefix post suggests the rise of differences that may exist alongside continued modern forms but that amount to an altered ethos (Lyotard, 1988: 277) . This article alludes specifically to one aspect of the transformed condition: the epistemological horizons within which critical criminology presents its knowledge claims.
2. As Platt argues: 'the new attention to short-term reforms is a welcome corrective to the utopianism of the past. At the same time, there is a very real danger that this tendency will become indistinguishable from the liberalism of the 1960s and 1970s, and that the search for longer-term structural solutions will be abandoned ' (1984: 197) . 3. If there is an overture towards universality in critique by paralogy, it has to do with nurturing searches for new ideas; but this is an open-ended invitation, not an apodictic decree that radically subordinates local variation to overarching principles. This implies a version of universality that extends beyond modern visions of the eternal, and accepts Foucault's caution that totalizing critical programs have 'led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions ' (1984: 46) .
